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This thesis investigates the employment and welfare 
effects of social insurance programs and minimum wage 
policy.1 The first chapter provides new estimates of the 
income effect of welfare transfers on individual labor supply. 
Using administrative data on survivor insurance in Italy, and 
quasi-experimental variation in the benefit amount received 
by surviving spouses, I find that survivors fully offset the 
benefit loss with increases in earnings. Extensive-margin 
responses—in the form of increased labor-market entry at 
younger ages and delayed retirement at older ages—are the 
main driver of the earnings response. A revealed-preference 
model demonstrates that large participation responses to real-
ized benefit drops are revealing of large implicit valuations 
of welfare transfers in the widowhood state. 
The second chapter analyzes the employment and welfare 
effects of short-time work programs (STW), which subsidize 
hour reductions in firms affected by temporary shocks. The 
analysis uses administrative data from Italy and quasi- 
experimental variation in STW policy rules to identify the 
effects of STW on firms and workers, and on reallocation in 
the labor market. STW has a large and significant negative 
effect on hours, but large and positive effects on headcount 
employment. However, these effects disappear once the 
subsidy ends. Similarly, STW does not provide long-term 
insurance to workers. Finally, STW has significant negative 
reallocation effects on employment growth at the local labor 
market level. A conceptual framework assesses the welfare 
implications of STW and provides a general formula for the 
optimal subsidy. 
The third chapter investigates the impact of minimum 
wages on firm behavior and the within-firm wage structure. 
The analysis exploits the natural experiment of the National 
Living Wage (NLW) introduction and matched employer- 
employee data on English care homes. No evidence of 
adverse employment effects or firm closure is found. Rather, 
homes bound more tightly by the NLW exhibit smaller 
short-run improvements in the quality of care services. There 
is strong evidence of positive wage spillovers onto younger 
workers, but with no negative employment spillovers. 
Employers’ preferences for fairness emerge as the most plau-
sible explanation for the observed wage spillovers. 
The fourth chapter investigates the nature of alternative 
work arrangements in the U.K. labor market, placing a 
particular focus on zero-hours contracts (ZHC). Combining 
existing secondary data and newly collected survey data, 
the analysis documents the importance and characteristics 
of ZHC work. The chapter also explores the extent to which 
higher minimum wages have potential to induce a larger 
utilization of alternative work arrangements by firms and, 
consequently, a shift in the composition of their workforce 
toward more flexible, but also insecure jobs. Minimum wage 
increases are shown to have resulted in greater utilization of 
ZHCs in the U.K. social care sector, and in low-wage sectors 
more generally. 
Chapter 1
When Income Effects Are Large: Labor Supply 
Responses and the Value of Welfare Transfers
The effect of income on labor supply is a parameter of 
great importance for both theory and policy analysis. From a 
policy perspective, income effects are central to the evalu-
ation of a broad set of policies involving income transfers, 
such as social insurance programs, public pension schemes, 
and tax policies. Income effects are also important for wel-
fare analysis, since they are directly related to the marginal 
utility of consumption (Chetty 2004, 2008). 
In spite of their importance for economic analysis, we 
still know surprisingly little about income effects, especially 
in the context of tax and benefit programs. This is mostly 
due to identification challenges: social insurance and tax and 
transfer programs generally involve simultaneous changes in 
income and work incentives, which make it hard to sepa-
rately identify income and substitution elasticities. For this 
reason, income effects have been typically assumed away 
or calibrated. Most quasi-experimental estimates of income 
effects are based on transfers that are either too modest to 
trigger a response or relatively short-lived, implying that 
observed responses may be substantially attenuated by opti-
mization frictions (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Kimball  
and Shapiro 2008; Marinescu 2018; Pencavel 1986). It is 
therefore still unresolved whether existing estimates of 
income effects are indeed capturing the true effects of income 
on labor supply, especially in relation to welfare transfers. 
In this chapter, I provide novel estimates of the income 
effect of welfare transfers on individual labor supply. I 
exploit a unique research setting in the context of the Italian 
survivor insurance scheme, which provides a pension benefit 
to surviving spouses of deceased retirees and workers. The 
benefit is computed as a fraction of the deceased’s pension 
and starts from the beginning of the month following the 
death.2 I take advantage of a policy change that introduced 
an exogenous, large and permanent discontinuity in the 
fraction of the deceased’s pension received by survivors on 
the basis of their spouse’s death date. Specifically, the reform 
decreased the fraction of the deceased’s pension received 
by survivors whose benefit started on or after September 1, 
1995, generating a discontinuity in expected lifetime benefits 
and de facto introducing two parallel benefit regimes of 
exogenously different generosity that would then coexist for 
a long time.
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Using newly released, rich administrative data on the 
universe of survivor insurance payments and survivors’ con-
tributory histories from the Italian Social Security Admin-
istration (INPS), I implement a regression discontinuity 
design in the spousal death date—which is equivalent to the 
benefit start date— and compare the long-term outcomes of 
otherwise identical individuals receiving benefits of different 
generosity for a long time.3 The long-run identifying varia-
tion generated by the benefit reform offers a unique window 
on the long-run behavioral responses to a permanent reduc-
tion in benefits, allowing to estimate long-run effects that are 
plausibly not attenuated by short-run optimization frictions. 
Also, by comparing treated and control individuals similarly 
affected by the loss of a spouse, the identification strategy 
implicitly accounts for state-dependent preferences. 
I find that survivors fully offset the benefit loss by 
increasing their earnings and, as a result, do not experience 
any drop in disposable income. Specifically, in the 15 years 
after a spouse’s death, survivors affected by the reform lose 
on average €2,000 per year (a 21 percent drop relative to the 
old regime). In response, they increase their average annual 
earned income by a quantity equal to the benefit loss. This 
translates into an estimated marginal propensity to earn out 
of unearned income of approximately minus one.4 I docu-
ment substantial heterogeneity in the income effect by the 
relative severity of the benefit loss. 
I probe the large income response by examining its under-
lying mechanisms. Labor force participation is the main 
driver of the income response, in the form of increased labor 
market entry by younger survivors and delayed retirement by 
older survivors. Hours worked and the wage rate are found 
to have a muted response to changes in the benefit. I uncover 
interesting dynamic patterns in the participation response: 
the latter is silent in the two years after the spouse’s death 
and then grows steadily larger over time, reaching a differ-
ential of 18 percent after 15 years. The overall dynamic is 
consistent with the notion that optimization frictions, such as 
adjustment costs or—in the case analyzed—grief, attenuate 
responses in the short run and fade away over time. I investi-
gate program substitution responses as an additional margin 
of adjustment.5 I find that survivor benefit reductions trigger 
a statistically significant and economically sizable increase in 
the take-up of paid family leave and unemployment insur-
ance benefits. 
Finally, I discuss the normative implications of my find-
ings. In a simple revealed-preference framework, I demon-
strate that survivors’ participation responses to a realized drop 
in benefits reveal their implicit valuation of the benefit in the 
widowhood state, as measured by the gap in the marginal 
utility of consumption between the low-benefit  
and high-benefit regime. Intuitively, the extent to which 
individuals increase work effort in response to a drop in 
unearned income reveals, ceteris paribus, the consumption 
value that such lost income would have provided. Hence, 
larger responses must mean that the lost income is highly 
valued and that there are large welfare gains from recouping 
it. I estimate a marginal welfare gain from increased survivor 
insurance generosity of 0.5, which implies that the marginal 
utility of consumption is 50 percent higher among widow(er)s 
in the low-benefit regime as compared to widow(er)s in the 
high-benefit regime. This is in the higher end of the range of 
existing estimates of the value of social insurance. 
The findings in this chapter inform a long-standing line 
of research on the income effect of welfare transfers on labor 
supply.6 I contribute to this literature by providing well- 
identified estimates of the income effect from a large and 
permanent drop in unearned income, in the long term and in 
the context of publicly provided benefits. This chapter is also 
more broadly related to the literature on the labor supply and 
program substitution effects of social insurance programs.7 
It is also partly related to the literature on the divergence 
between steady-state macro and micro elasticities of labor 
supply.8 Finally, this chapter contributes to a growing body 
of work that attempts to evaluate the welfare gains of social 
insurance using empirically estimable “sufficient statis-
tics.”9 I contribute to this literature by providing a simple 
revealed-preference method based on within-state participa-
tion responses to benefit losses that allows for state depen-
dence and is applicable to a broad class of public policies 
involving income transfers. 
Chapter 2
Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions:  
The Employment and Welfare Effects of Short-
Time Work Programs
(with Camille Landais)
The Great Recession has generated a significant revival 
of interest in policies destined at encouraging labor hoarding 
by firms during downturns (e.g., Giroud and Mueller 2017; 
Yagan 2019). STW programs, which are subsidies for tempo-
rary reductions in the number of hours worked, are the most 
emblematic of such policies and have been used aggressively 
during the Great Recession, especially in European coun-
tries. The fraction of employees on STW in 2009 reached 
7 percent in Belgium, close to 5 percent in Germany, and 4 
percent in France.10 In Italy, according to social security data, 
4.6 percent of the workforce was in STW in 2013, for a cost 
of 0.5 percent of GDP. This revival of interest is also pal-
pable in the United States, where state STW programs have 
been actively promoted by the Job Creation Act of 2012. In 
2016, more than 28 U.S. states had implemented their own 
STW programs.11 
But what is behind this STW craze? Do we know that 
it is effective in stabilizing employment? Is it an effective 
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way to provide insurance to workers? More effective than 
unemployment insurance, for instance? More fundamentally, 
do we know anything about its welfare implications? What 
sources of inefficiencies are we trying to correct with STW? 
If we believe that hours or employment are not optimally set 
in the labor market, how can STW deal with these inefficien-
cies? Are we not creating additional inefficiencies with these 
programs by keeping workers in unproductive firms, prevent-
ing an efficient reallocation of labor? 
Despite STW being a key element to the countercyclical 
policy tool kit, and one of the main active labor market poli-
cies during downturns, we are completely at a loss to answer 
these fundamental questions. This is due to three simple 
reasons: 1) a critical lack of firm- or individual-level admin-
istrative data on STW;12 2) even in the presence of firm-level 
data, the lack of credible sources of identification of STW 
treatment;13 and 3) the lack of a simple, tractable yet general 
conceptual framework to rationalize the empirical evidence 
and feed the estimates back into a welfare evaluation of STW 
policies.14 
This chapter contributes to our understanding of STW by 
addressing these three limitations. It relies on uniquely rich 
administrative data on STW from Italy. It uses variation in 
eligibility rules across firms to provide compelling evidence 
of the causal impact of STW on firms’ and workers’ out-
comes. And it offers a simple and general conceptual frame-
work that maps onto our empirical results to transparently 
assess the welfare consequences of STW programs. 
Our data come from the INPS and cover the universe of 
Italian employer-employee matches in the private sector and 
the universe of all social security and transfer payments in 
Italy from 1983 to 2015. Besides granular information on 
firms and workers’ histories, it provides detailed information 
on eligibility, applications, and authorizations of the uni-
verse of STW episodes at both the firm and individual levels 
from 2005 to 2015. Identification stems from the interaction 
between two sources of variation in eligibility: INPS codes 
and firm size. First, we exploit the fact that within five-digit 
industries, certain firms, defined by particular INPS codes, 
are eligible while others are not, as per the implementa-
tion by INPS of STW legislation dating back to the 1970s. 
Second, we use the additional requirement that firms must 
be above a certain size threshold to be eligible. This enables 
us to test and control for the possibility that differential time 
shocks affected eligible and noneligible INPS codes within 
five-digit industries during the recession. We provide multi-
ple robustness checks for the validity of our approach.
Our results demonstrate that STW has large and signifi-
cant effects on firms’ employment at both the intensive and 
extensive margin. Compared to counterfactual firms, firms 
treated by STW experience a 40 percent reduction in hours 
worked per employee, and a similar magnitude increase 
in the number of employees in the firm, with no discern-
ible effect on wage rates. We show that these employment 
effects are temporary and immediately disappear once STW 
treatment stops. On the workers’ side, we similarly find that 
treatment effects are all concentrated in the short run. STW 
has immediate positive effects on employment probability, 
but negative effects on hours, and a positive effect on total 
earnings and transfers. But these effects disappear after 
treatment, so that STW provides no significant insurance to 
workers in the medium or long run. In fact, two years after 
treatment, there are no significant differences in the employ-
ment probability, earnings, and total income of workers who 
were treated by STW and workers who were counterfactually 
laid off. 
We then analyze the selection of firms into STW and the 
heterogeneity in the treatment effects of the program. We 
show that firms that were at the bottom of the productivity 
distribution before the recession are three times more likely 
than higher-productivity firms to take up STW during the 
recession and that employment effects for them are signifi-
cantly smaller. This suggests that STW is predominantly 
targeting firms that have permanently lower productivity and 
helps explain why STW does not entail long-term benefits. 
More importantly, this suggests that by keeping workers in 
low-productivity firms, STW may have significant negative 
reallocation effects in the labor market. 
To investigate these claims, we leverage the rich spatial 
variation available in Italy across more than 600 local labor 
markets and estimate how an increase in the fraction of 
workers on STW in a local labor market affects employment 
in nontreated firms. We instrument variation in the intensity 
of STW treatment across local labor markets by the average 
yearly fraction of eligible workers in the local labor market 
in the prerecession period, controlling for a rich set of firm 
and local labor market characteristics. Our results provide 
compelling evidence of the presence of equilibrium effects 
of STW. STW significantly decreases employment growth 
and inflow rates in nontreated firms, and has a significant 
negative impact on total factor productivity growth in the 
labor market. 
We finally provide a tractable search and matching frame-
work that rationalizes these empirical findings and maps our 
estimates into a transparent welfare evaluation of STW. Our 
model is directly related to the public finance literature on 
optimal policies in equilibrium models of the labor mar-
ket (see, for instance, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2018; 
Michaillat and Saez 2019). The main insight is that optimal 
STW not only balances the insurance value of the subsidy 
with its fiscal externality but also needs to account for two 
additional sources of inefficiencies: 1) employment may be 
inefficient because of the frictional nature of the labor mar-
ket, and 2) equilibrium hours may also not be at their socially 
optimal level due to the missing market for hours. STW will 
entail positive welfare gains when equilibrium employment 
is suboptimally low and hours suboptimally high, and our 
formula offers a clear representation of these terms. 
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Our approach offers the possibility to conduct a local 
welfare calibration using our reduced form estimates, which 
suggests that, in the current Italian context, the marginal 
welfare gains of further increases in STW are small. Finally, 
we use a calibrated version of the model to run nonmarginal 
counterfactual analysis and quantify the welfare effects of 
removing STW. This analysis confirms that the welfare gains 
of further increases in the generosity of STW are small, but 
the value of having STW is significantly positive. We also 
use the calibrated model to show that the immediate employ-
ment effects of STW are significantly larger when the aggre-
gate shock is temporary than when it is permanent, as firms’ 
desire to hoard labor is greater for temporary shocks. 
Chapter 3
Changing the Structure of Minimum Wages: 
Firm Adjustment and Wage Spillovers
(with Stephen J. Machin)
The by-now centennial history of minimum wages and 
their widespread application across developed and develop-
ing countries has triggered a great deal of academic research 
and policy discussion on the topic. Recent years have seen 
a burst of renewed interest in minimum wage policy. In this 
chapter, we study the effect of a substantive change in the 
U.K. minimum wage structure on firm behavior and the 
within-firm wage structure. The change occurred when in 
July 2015 the newly elected Conservative Party government 
unexpectedly announced the introduction of the National 
Living Wage (NLW). This altered the structure of U.K. 
minimum wages by introducing a new minimum wage rate 
of £7.20 an hour for workers aged 25 or above starting April 
2016, while leaving the minimum wage rates for younger 
workers unchanged. 
We are interested in analyzing the consequences of this 
change on three main areas that have been traditionally 
explored in the minimum wage literature. Firstly, wage and 
employment effects are studied in the context of workers and 
firms in the U.K. care home sector, which has been argued 
to be a good testing ground for evaluating minimum wage 
effects on employment in earlier research (Machin, Manning, 
and Rahman 2003; Machin and Wilson 2004). Secondly, 
we exploit the age-related change in minimum wage rates 
to study whether the NLW induced wage or employment 
spillovers onto workers under 25. Thirdly, we explore the 
possibility that care homes responded to the wage cost 
shock by altering other margins, such as prices, productivity, 
and the quality of care services provided. In addition, we 
consider whether the policy had implications for aggregate 
employment and firm dynamics (entry and exit). 
We leverage the unique natural experiment offered 
by the U.K. policy setting, coupled with rich matched 
employer-employee data, including detailed information on 
individual hourly wages for the English care home sec-
tor. Empirically, we implement a difference-in-differences 
with continuous treatment, where we exploit between-firm 
variation in exposure to the NLW to identify the effect of the 
minimum wage increase on firm-level outcomes over the 12 
months following the reform.
The changed minimum wage structure and associated 
higher minimum wage for those aged 25 and above signifi-
cantly impacted wages, but there is much less evidence of 
adverse employment effects, and no significant impact on 
firm closure nor on entry/exit dynamics more generally one 
year after. Rather, the margin of adjustment that was used 
was the quality of care services. Care homes bound more 
tightly by the NLW exhibited smaller short-run improve-
ments in the quality of care services than less-bound homes.
There is also strong evidence of wage spillovers resulting 
from the new minimum wage structure as younger work-
ers’ wages rose in tandem with the higher adult minimum 
wage, but with no spillover impact on their employment. We 
discuss potential explanations for this pattern of spillovers, 
including preferences for pay fairness and administrative 
simplicity. The evidence suggests that employers’—rather 
than workers’—preferences for fairness play an important 
role in within-firm wage-setting policies in the sector that is 
studied. 
The content of this chapter relates to all of the three 
main streams along which the minimum wage literature has 
evolved through time. Firstly, the primary focus of this liter-
ature has been on the employment and unemployment effects 
of minimum wages.15 Secondly—and partly in response to 
the fact that, in a number of settings, employment effects 
have proven elusive to track down—a smaller but growing 
body of research has examined other margins of adjustment 
by firms, such as prices, profits, and firm value.16 Thirdly, 
another strand of the minimum wage literature has studied 
the impact on wage inequality at the bottom of the distri-
bution and at spillover effects up the wage distribution.17 
Thanks to a combination of rich data sources and a novel 
research setting, we contribute to this literature by providing 
a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the NLW intro-
duction on employment and other margins of firm adjust-
ment, as well as new evidence on downward wage spillovers. 
Chapter 4
Zero-Hours Contracts and Labor  
Market Policy
(with Nikhil Datta and Stephen J. Machin)
Alternative work arrangements, such as independent 
contractors, temp agency workers, and contract company 
workers, are a growing and increasingly important feature of 
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the labor markets of many developed economies. Alternative 
work arrangements have been growing not only in self- 
employment, but also as an evolution of traditional employ-
ment jobs. One such example is ZHCs, whereby workers 
agree to be available for work as and when required, with no 
guaranteed hours or times of work. In the past 10 years, the 
number of workers on ZHCs increased tenfold in the United 
Kingdom, reaching one million in 2017. The increased 
incidence of this kind of work has led to discussions of 
there being a trade-off between additional flexibility and 
the emergence of low-wage, dead-end jobs, which function 
outside the job legislation offered in conventional forms of 
employment. From a research perspective, it is important to 
try to determine which side of this trade-off dominates, and if 
it differs by work arrangement.
In this chapter, we examine the labor market in the United 
Kingdom, where the rise of atypical work has been a key 
feature of the post-financial-crisis period. The focus is placed 
specifically on one kind of alternative work arrangement 
that has increasingly entered the U.K. setting, namely ZHCs. 
Almost a million people are on ZHCs at the time of writing, 
out of a total workforce of 32 million. Many of these ZHC 
work positions are prominent in the low-wage sectors of 
employment. Their relevance to labor market policy that 
affects low-wage levels is therefore high. 
The principal focus of the chapter is placed on develop-
ing a better understanding of ZHCs and labor market policy. 
In doing this, the chapter has two main aims. The first is to 
empirically document the evolution and characterization of 
ZHCs in the U.K. setting. There are two parts to this—the 
first draws on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
and the second on newly collected survey data on alternative 
work arrangements. Part of the latter survey is devoted to 
ZHCs, which are surveyed and understood only limitedly 
in existing survey data sources (Abraham and Amaya 2018) 
and, consequently, in the literature, and the intention is to fill 
this gap with new evidence. 
The second aim is to explore the extent to which labor 
market institutions have the scope to be, at least partly, 
responsible for the increased diffusion of flexible work 
arrangements, or, conversely, whether the latter are a con-
sequence of factors that have little to do with labor market 
institutions and rigidities. In this chapter, a particular policy 
focus is placed on minimum wages, where we are inter-
ested in understanding whether higher minimum wages 
have potential to induce a larger utilization of alternative 
work arrangements by firms and, consequently, a shift in the 
composition of their workforce toward more flexible but also 
insecure jobs. 
In Europe, the rise of alternative work arrangements 
and gig-economy jobs is often considered an expression of 
the duality of the labor market, whereby the existence of 
rigidities in the ‘primary’ market creates the conditions for 
an expansion of more flexible contractual relationships in the 
secondary market. Alternative work arrangements have also 
grown in the United States, where labor markets overall are 
less rigid than in Europe but where minimum wages are an 
important component of labor market policies. By providing 
direct evidence on the role—or lack thereof—of minimum 
wage policies on the incidence of flexible work arrange-
ments, this chapter contributes to understanding a policy 
question relevant to both the United States and European 
labor markets. 
In the first part of the chapter, survey-based evidence is 
presented to show that ZHCs are a key contract type in some 
predominantly low-wage, sectors of the U.K. labor market. 
Coupled with limited and fragmented hours, such low pay 
implies high levels of earnings insecurity. A stark dichotomy 
emerges between workers who value the flexibility provided 
by ZHC jobs and workers who would rather work more and 
more regular hours, and therefore appear to be engaged in 
ZHCs out of necessity rather than by choice. ZHCs also 
feature, in different guises or by different names, in other 
countries’ employment structures. 
The second part of the chapter analyzes minimum wage 
policy and ZHC utilization by exploiting a substantial 
increase in the minimum wage rate for workers aged 25 and 
over that took place in the United Kingdom in April 2016, 
when a new minimum wage rate—the NLW—was intro-
duced (Bell and Machin 2018; Giupponi and Machin 2018). 
In the U.K. setting, ZHC usage by employers does seem to 
have been affected by changes in labor market policy, as 
the sizable hike of the minimum wage that occurred when 
the NLW was introduced did shift more workers onto ZHC 
positions in the adult social care sector (and in low-wage 
sectors more generally). To our knowledge, this is the first 
study connecting minimum wage changes to employers’ use 
of different types of job contracts. 
Notes
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DYNAMICSS, the INPS Valeria Solesin Fellowship, ESRC, 
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findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the 
authors and do not represent the views of INPS. Chapter 3: We 
acknowledge financial support from the Low Pay Commission. 
Chapter 4: We acknowledge financial support from ESRC 
(ESRC Grant No. ES/S000097/1).
 2. Entitlement to the benefit is lost upon remarriage. It otherwise 
continues until death.
 3. In the empirical analysis, I restrict the sample to individuals 
aged 55 and under at the time of their spouse’s death.
 4. The income effect—or marginal propensity to earn out of 
unearned income—is measured as the change in earned 
income for a unit change in unearned income.
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 5. Program substitution refers to a change in take-up of other 
social assistance and social insurance programs (conditional 
on eligibility) in response to a change in a given program’s 
generosity (Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimüller 2016).
 6. See, among others, Robins (1985); Burtless (1986);  
Ashenfelter and Plant (1990); Hum and Simpson (1993); 
Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001); Akee et al. (2010); 
Cesarini et al. (2017); and Jones and Marinescu (2018).
 7. On disability insurance, see Bound (1989); French and Song 
(2014); Kostol and Mogstad (2014); Autor et al. (2016);  
Deshpande (2016a,b); and Autor et al. (2019). On health 
insurance, see Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014); on 
earned income tax credits, Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Saez 
(2010); on retirement wealth, Krueger and Pischke (1992) and 
Gelber, Isen, and Song (2016, 2017).
 8. See Chetty et al. (2011) for a review of this literature.
 9. See Baily (1978); Gruber (1997); Chetty (2006); Shimer and 
Werning (2008); Chetty (2008); Landais (2015); Hendren 
(2017); Dobkin et al. (2018); Fadlon and Nielsen (2019);  
Fadlon, Ramnath, and Tong (2019); and Landais and  
Spinnewijn (2019).
 10. See Hijzen and Martin (2013) and Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nev-
oux (2018).
 11. U.S. Department of Labor Office (2016).
 12. As a matter of example, the German social security administra-
tion (IAB) does not collect data on STW. Most STW appli-
cations and reports are sent in a paper format to the Federal 
Employment Agency and are not digitized. Only a sample of 
these reports has been digitized for the Nuremberg metropoli-
tan area for years 2008 to 2010 and matched to IAB data (Tilly 
and Niedermayer 2016).
 13. In most countries with large STW programs in place, such as 
Germany or France, there is no variation in a firm’s eligibility 
to take up STW. Most papers therefore rely on the structure of 
calibrated models to analyze the effects of STW on workers 
and firms (Tilly and Niedermayer 2016; Cooper, Meyer, and 
Schott 2017). Other studies instrument STW take-up during 
the recession with the prior experience of firms with the pro-
gram (e.g. Boeri and Brücker 2011; Cahuc and Carcillo 2011; 
Hijzen and Martin 2013) and find competing results. Recently, 
Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018) offer a credible and 
compelling IV strategy in the French context. They instrument 
STW take up using the proximity of a firm to other firms hav-
ing used STW before recessions. They also use as an alterna-
tive instrument response time variation in the administrative 
treatment of STW applications across French departments. 
They find, similar to our results, large and significant employ-
ment effects of STW treatment.
 14. While a small theoretical literature shows (not surprisingly) 
that STW may distort both hours (Burdett and Wright 1989) 
and the allocation of workers across firms, thus reducing out-
put (Cooper, Meyer, and Schott 2017), there is no clear view of 
the conditions under which STW programs might be socially 
desirable and improve welfare.
 15. Following an early and mostly U.S.-based time-series work 
that found negative employment effects among teenagers 
(Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982), starting from the early 
1990s quasi-experimental micro-based studies found no 
evidence of disemployment effects in the United States and 
the United Kingdom (Card and Krueger 1994; Machin, 
Manning, and Rahman 2003; Stewart 2004). A recent revival 
of minimum wage research in the US has adopted spatial 
identification strategies, also mostly finding it hard to detect 
evidence of job cuts due to minimum wages (Dube, Lester, and 
Reich 2010, 2016; Baskaya and Rubinstein 2015; Clemens and 
Wither 2019). In a rather different context of union bargained 
minima, Kreiner, Reck, and Skov (forthcoming) study the 
effect of a change in the youth minimum wage in Denmark and 
find an employment elasticity to the wage rate of −0.8.
 16. On prices, see Aaronson (2001), MaCurdy (2015), and Harasz-
tosi and Lindner (2019); on profits, see Draca, Machin, and 
Van Reener (2011); and on stock market values, see Bell and 
Machin (2018). Multiple adjustment channels are studied in 
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2015), and Harasztosi and 
Lindner (2019). Sorkin (2015) emphasizes the distinction 
between modes of adjustment in the short and long run.
 17. See DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Lee (1999), and 
Autor, Manning, and Smith (2016).
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